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Mass Politics and the Democratic 
Challenge :  
The prospects of Democratic Consolidation 
in Haiti 
 
par Moise S. TIRANO 
University of Massachusetts, Amherst 
 
 
More than three years after the US-led “ Operation Restore 
Democracy ” reestablished the democratically elected government, the 
future of democracy in Haiti still remains ambiguous. The terrorist 
state of the Duvaliers and the predatory state of the Cedras-elite-FRAPH 
alliance are no longer wreaking havoc on the population and the 
treasury. Yet not much has changed ; institutions are still corrupt and 
inadequate, the economy has deteriorated and the police force offers no 
protection to the average citizen. The optimism of the pro-democracy 
movement has eroded and the population is becoming more and more 
frustrated with the political grandstanding of inexperienced politicians 
and the decline in living standards. While democratization may in fact 
be “ the solution to the problem of tyranny ” so far, it has not offered 
much hope for Haiti’s future (Huntington 1997:3). In a country where 
law and order, (whatever little of it existed before the democratization 
process) were maintained by the wielding of “ coco macaques ”1, an 
increased frustration and belligerency of the masses threatens to lead 
the country into anarchy and overrun the state. 
 
 
                                                          
1
. Creole for wooden stick. 
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The middle and lower classes have become disenchanted. Voter 
turnout is at its lowest from 90 % participation in 1990 to less than 
30 % during the 1995 presidential elections and 20 % in 1997. The 
international community has practically stopped caring due to the 
inability of the government to get austerity measures required by the 
IMF through parliament. Crime has been increasing steadily and the 
newly organized and poorly equipped National police force is unable 
to uphold law and order and provide security for the average citizen. 
All of this while inexperienced politicians continue the get rich quick 
schemes of their predecessors, abusing state resources and funds. The 
presidency as an institution is under siege by parliament while the 
president is “ fence seating ” – trying not to undermine his mentor 
Aristide or raise the ire of the uncontrollable, unchallenged urban 
masses. Neighborhood vigilantism has become the primary line of 
defense against night invasions and murders by “ Zinglin Dou ”2, a 
phenomena which never existed in Haitian society. 
This essay seeks to evaluate Haitian democracy through the 
dominant democratic transition and consolidation debate by which all 
democracies are being assessed and the inherent assumptions being 
made about the state, civil society, electoral politics, institutional 
capacity and the popular sector. While it is true that Haitian democracy 
faces an uphill battle, it will be argued that democracy can still thrive 
and a serious attempt to meet people’s expectation that democracy 
should mean a better life for themselves and their children may be 
undertaken with the right institutional reforms, responsible and 
competent leadership, state enhancement, and the curbing of mob 
politics. 
 
                                                          
2
 Armed thieves, mainly former military and Haitian-American gang bangers 
deported by the US who invade peoples houses at night raping, killing and robbing 
them. 
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WHAT ARE THE ROOTS OF THE HAITIAN EXPERIENCE? 
Some scholars3 are quick to fault more than thirty years of 
dictatorship and the culture of intolerance and authoritarianism it 
imposed on the population. Others4, have focused on the foundation of 
the Haitian state as the primary obstacle to nation-building and 
democracy. Whether Haiti’s difficult transition can be explained by a 
lack of Western Culture or statelessness, is the site of much 
contentions. What is clear however is that democracy is far from being 
“ the only game in town ” and the fate of the Haitian state depends 
greatly on the ability to navigate in the treacherous waters of popular 
democracy, lack of democratic leadership and neo-liberal economic 
policies. 
REQUISITE, PRE-REQUISITE AND ASSUMPTIONS. 
There is consensus among many democratic transitologists and 
consolidationists that the existence of certain political and institutional 
conditions within a system is indicative of its democratic strength 
(Huntington 1996 ; Wiarda 1997 ; Revel 1983 ; and Dahl 1971). For 
these scholars, “ the real possibility for change in government, 
electoral competition and a high level of collective action ” coupled 
with a high dose of “ constitutional opposition ” formed the key pre-
requisites for establishing democracy5. Together, Dahl’s seven 
polyarchical institutional attributes, Wiarda, Huntington and Revel’s 
emphasis on human rights and O’Donnell’s four pragmatic 
propositions “ constitute the lasting, universal, necessary conditions of 
any democracy ”6. 
 
                                                          
3
 Huntington (1984 ; 1996) is the main proponent for such a view. 
4
 Throuillot, (1995) and Ruffat (1991) 
5
 Flifisch - found in Tulchin and Varas (1991 : 13).  Also see Lawson (1993)  
6
 Lyman, Diquattro and Burke (1994 : 132).  
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Dahl (1971), listed seven institutional conditions necessary for 
the establishment of contemporary democracy which have been 
accepted by the majority democracy scholars. They are : 1) elected 
officials ; 2) free and fair elections ; 3) inclusive suffrage ; 4) eligibility 
for all public office ; 5) enforced right to freedom of expression ; 6) 
free access to alternative sources of information for all ; 7) the right to 
form and join organizations.  
Revel (1993) Wiarda (1979, 1988 & 1990) ; Huntington (1968, 
1993 & 1997) ; O’Donnell (1997). 
O’Donnell’s recent article in the Journal of Democracy offered 
the following four new considerations to the democratic debate : 
1) “ Elected officials should not be arbitrarily terminated before 
the end of their constitutionally mandated terms ” 
2) “ Elected authorities should not be subject to constraints, 
vetoes, or exclusion from certain policy domain by other, non-elected 
actors, especially the armed forces ” 
3) “ An uncontested national territory that clearly defines the 
voting population ” 
4) “ The expectation that a fair electoral process and its 
surrounding freedoms will continue into an indefinite future ” 
(O’Donnell 1997 : 35-6). 
A sizable middle class, economic growth, and high literacy rates 
are also viewed as fundamental complements in transitions from 
authoritarian to democratic rule. Democracy is seen as a middle and 
upper class affair and an attempt to wrestle power away from 
authoritarian rulers by conservative, “ trickle downist ” forces seeking 
greater access to economic resources and political power. Democratic 
opening is closely associated with political and human rights, wherein 
the middle class seeks full partnership, if not full control of the politics 
and economies of their countries.  
Transitologists and Consolidationists make six main 
assumptions in framing the debate and establishing their list of pre-
requisites. 
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1) A clear state identity or a nation exists that facilitates the 
transition from authoritarianism to democratic governance. To quote 
Stepan and Linz, “ no state, no democracy ” (Stepan and Linz 
1996:14). 
2) The Institutional frameworks capable of surviving the 
transition and instituting permanent and viable reforms to adapt to the 
new politico-social environment are already present. 
3) Political leaders have no other option but to play by the 
democratic rules. 
4) Demands for democracy entail a change in the political 
culture among the democratic participants (i.e. the populace and the 
ruling elites). 
5) Institutions are capable of imposing constraints on all 
participants involved in the democratic project and to maintain their 
autonomy as institutions of rules and neutral arbiter in the democratic 
system.  
6) Institutional capacity, and their ability to adapt to the new 
role required by the democratic process were thus seen as 
indispensable.  
Transitologists and Consolidationists scholars assume that : 
1) The military will be capable of functioning professionally as 
a protector of the country’s sovereignty and borders. 
2) The police force will be a separate entity from the army and 
strong enough to maintain order and the rule of law within the nation. 
Furthermore, that its capacity to provide security to all citizens will be 
a “fait accompli”. 
3) The judiciary will be able to provide justice for all and enjoy 
the confidence of all parties as well as remain autonomous from 
political actors and parties. 
4) Parliament will have competent and relatively experienced 
leaders capable of constructive debates and prescriptions. 
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5) Financial institutions and ministries will have people 
concerned primarily with the good of the nation instead of their party 
affiliations and personal interests. 
For them, a crucial break from the previous non-democratic 
system and the undermining and peripheralization of non-democratic 
norms and practices by the new democratic institutions was a 
necessity. 
Associating democratic transitions to middle class demands, 
scholars such as Huntington (1968, 1996); Revel (1985) ; Dahl (1971) 
and O’Donnel & Schmitter (1986), consigned the popular sector to the 
voting booths. With no real power that the coercive arms of the state 
would not be able to control, for these scholars, it is simply 
inconceivable that the popular sector could become powerful enough to 
undermine the power of the ruling elites and question the legitimacy of 
the most important national institutions. A top down transition is seen 
as not only desirable, but highly sought after, and an “ over-
politicized ” civil society and uncontrolled/unrestricted demands on the 
state are viewed as major threats to democracy7. Many of these 
scholars concur with the Huntingtonian assertion that “ democratic 
regimes that last have seldom if ever, been instituted by mass popular 
action ”8. The Haitian democratic experience ran counter to many of 
these assumptions. By the time the first democratic election took place, 
the only institution, although weakened, that still remained a force in 
the country was the military. Its ranks had by then been depleted by 
coups, infighting and voluntary or forced exilement of some of its best 
officers. The advent of democracy found the economy, school system, 
judiciary, church and all the major institutions of the state unable to 
function and displaying extreme inadequacy. 
 
                                                          
7
 See Samuel P.  Huntington (1968) and Sangmpam (1996) 
8
 Samuel P. Huntington, (1984, 212.) 
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HAITIAN REALITY AND PARTICULARISM 
The Economy 
The economic conditions under which Haitian democracy 
evolved were disastrous at best. Agricultural export revenues decreased 
from $ 113 million (US) in 1983/1984 to $ 62.4 million in 1987/1988. 
Two hundred thousand homeless people lived in the capital, 15,000 
people moved to the capital from the countryside, adding to an already 
over populated city. Between 1985 and 1990, 25,000 Haitians 
emigrated. Unemployment was 60 % ; however, 20 %  of the 40 % 
listed as employed were actually under-employed (Victor, 1990, 36 - 
8). Needless to say, there were insurmountable economic hardships and 
disparities that provided real challenges for Haitian democracy ab 
initio. By the end of the Duvaliers’ dictatorship in 1986, 95 % of the 
rural population lived in abject poverty, three (3) out of four (4) 
children suffered from malnutrition, 75 - 80 % of the population was 
still illiterate. Annual revenue per capita was also as low as $ 40.00 
(US) for peasants and as high as 120,000 for the 1 % elite minority. 
Four thousand families out of a population of over 6 million had 
complete control over the economy and 44 % of the national revenue. 
30 % of landowners owned 2/3 of the arable land and the educational 
system was barely capable of serving 15 % of the population (Castor 
1990, 50 - 89)9. Shin’s assertion that “ at the individual level, 
increasing education and expanding income exposed the masses to the 
virtues of democratic civilization ” seems highly contentious when we 
examine Haiti (Shin, 1994, 341). Yet, the call for democracy was 
overwhelming and unequivocal. 
 
                                                          
9
 The figures cited in this paragraph reflect work done by Castor (1990) and Victor 
(1990), covering the period of 1985 to 1990. 
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The Judiciary 
The judiciary was never independent during the dictatorship. Its 
decisions were usually bought or dictated by power brokers within the 
government. It never enjoyed the confidence of the population. Various 
efforts were made after the fall of Baby Doc by reformist elements in 
its ranks, but few of them were taken seriously. The institution mainly 
served the interest of the powerful and more often than not, it ignored 
violations of rights, arbitrary arrests, imprisonment, beatings, and 
seizures of lands. Had the institution been able to address these 
violations, it would have gained legitimacy in the eyes of the populace. 
Unfortunately the judiciary’s pocketbook justice meant that for those 
who did not have the capacity to pay, justice was usually unavailable. 
The involvement of high court officials in political office would further 
damage the reputation of the judiciary and sudden interests in the 
manipulation and interpretations of laws and constitutional matter 
further damaged whatever confidence remained in the institutions10. 
Recent attempts to reform the judiciary have been largely 
unsuccessful mainly because the same judges who served under 
Duvalier and the military dictatorship remain in office and individual 
connections and bribery are still dominant features of the system11.  
 
                                                          
10
 The court on many occasions interfered with negotiations for the return of 
Aristide, supposedly on constitutional grounds. The judiciary often sided with the 
military regime that ousted the elected government. 
11
 Known torturers and murderers arrested after the return of Aristide have been 
released without any clear explanation. This has occurred both in Les Cayes and Port-
au-Prince. Judges throughout Haiti are being arrested and/or there are complaints about 
their involvement in illegal activities. Capable judges are being let go due to their 
unwillingness to provide quick justice which very often would have amounted to 
sentencing or incarceration without trials to satisfy the populace. 
196 Moïse S. TIRANO 
 
  
 
PDLC n° 10, 1998 
The Military 
The demise of Duvalierism left the country totally under the 
leadership of the military. Baby Doc had been permitted to form a 
military junta to replace him before his exile and this created an 
exceptional opportunity for the military to re-assert itself. The armed 
forces had played a subordinate role since the rise of Francois Duvalier 
in 1957 and the creation of a parallel armed force – the VSN12, better 
known as the Tonton Macoutes to supplant the military13. In the early 
1980s, conflicts developed between the military and the Macoutes. 
After more than two decades of subordination, the army cautiously 
attempted to re-assert its autonomy and protect its interests14. Military 
officers such as Abraham, Avril, Namphy and Regala sought an end to 
Macoutism to ensure the monopoly of state coercion. Already in the 
making for many years, the military/Macoutes conflict took center 
stage in the period from 1980 to 1990. Two months before Baby Doc’s 
exile, the army refused to use their coercive power against the masses 
and protected the populace against attacks from the Macoutes. In the 
months that followed his departure, the military, disarmed most of the 
Macoutes and became the only organized armed force in Haiti. This act 
was misinterpreted by the population who praised the army and 
joyously carried its members on their shoulders throughout the capital. 
 
                                                          
12
 VSN stands for Volontaire de la Sécurite Nationale (Volunteer for National 
Security).  
13
 In 1957, after Francois Duvalier became president, he embarked on a systematic 
elimination of important members of the corps. In his first two years, he removed 6 
colonels, 9 majors, 28 captains and 26 lieutenants. Also 12 colonels, 11 majors, 15 
captains and 17 lieutenants were victims of assassinations and deadly attacks from 
Duvaliers’ Tonton Macoutes. Another 19 officers were executed in June 1967. Most of 
these vacant spaces were filled by some of his own forces (Delince, 1979 : 222-4). 
14
 The army had regained some strength under Baby Doc because of the latter’s 
unwillingness to maintain the balance created by his father. Baby Doc has inserted 
many of his schoolmates in the army and with the help of the US had organized a 
counterinsurgency battalion (the leopards) which became the state’s most important, 
well trained and well equipped force. The Leopards lost a confrontation with the army 
after the fall of Baby Doc and were subsequently disbanded. 
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This “ marriage ” between the army and the populace soon changed as 
the army flexed its muscle, and carried out its agenda of law, order and 
Duvalierism. The population once again found itself under the gun by a 
military determined to remain in control of Haitian politics. However, 
having control of the state was not without its consequences. 
Factionalism stemming from ideological differences, political 
ambitions and personality conflicts between the officers persisted 
within the corps. Between 1986 and 1990, officers fought each other 
for control of the national treasury, drug trafficking and political 
power. Four military coups were orchestrated by low ranking semi-
illiterate officers in the name and sometimes without the permission of 
their senior officers. Dissension within its ranks weakened the military 
and made it possible for the popular sector to challenge its control of 
the state and its legitimacy. 
The Church and the Elites 
The transitional period saw a rise in friction within all the ruling 
elite circles. The church and economic elites were no exception to this 
phenomena. Before 1986 conflicts emerged within the church, a 
longtime supporter of the Duvaliers, and its growing liberation 
theologians. Led by Aristide, liberation theology became a central 
force in the mass movement, creating dissent within the church 
hierarchy and excitement in the populace. Having been politically 
neutralized by Papa Doc in the late 1950s, the Haitian elites remained 
co-opted by the system until they too began to experience dissent 
within their ranks. The technocrats, mostly Noirist elites15 who have 
their roots in the Duvalier dynasty, have historically competed with the 
mulatto elite sector16. The technocrats, children of the Duvalierist 
 
                                                          
15
 The Noirists are black power advocates that came into power in 1946. They were 
mainly from middle class background  (See Nichol, 1979). 
16
 This is extremely important in Haitian history and dates back from the beginning 
of the revolution and accounted for the political instability in Haiti from 1791 to the 
rise of Papa Doc. The Black/Mulatto conflict subsided during the US occupation and 
became dominant in the period following the Marines departure from Haiti in 1934. 
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revolution, turned against Baby Doc opting for political liberalization. 
This shift in alliance was mostly the result of the frustrations created 
by the re-emergence of the Mulatto class and its monopolization of 
economic opportunities, the marriage of Baby Doc to Michelle 
Bennett17 and the loss of power experienced by the Noirists after the 
wedding. More politically powerful than the mulattos, the technocrats 
facilitated the fall of Duvalierism that had created them and whom they 
had, until then, tacitly supported. Duvalierism without Duvalier 
appeared to have been their motivation but internal dissent, ambitions 
and the assault of the popular sector that would no longer tolerate the 
vestiges of a system that oppressed them for close to thirty years, 
would undermine their coherence and political goals. 
Democratic Transition :  
The power vacuum of the 1986 - 1990 period 
This “chin manje chin18” crisis within the ruling elites and the 
army’s hesitancy in dealing with the urban sector, diverted pressure 
from the masses. Being the only coercive apparatus, the army became 
more and more alarmed as Haitians took justice into their own hands. 
Lawlessness, looting, mob violence in the name of justice and banditry 
became commonplace. The activities of the urban masses in the post-
dictatorship period created an environment of fear, and anarchy 
(Chamberlain 1995 - NACLA). These activities challenged the 
military’s role as a guarantor of order, security and peace. They also 
frightened the elites who not only feared for their lives, but knew that 
at any time, their businesses and private properties could fall prey to 
the masses. Various attempts by the military to restrain the masses 
                                                          
 
Papa Doc (Francois Duvalier) used the Tonton Macoutes to destroy Mulatto’s political 
power and is still held in High regards by many within the middle class for doing so. 
See Nichols(1979). 
17
 The Bennetts were Mulattos and Baby Doc’s marriage into the mulatto class and 
their subsequent prominence in the political sphere angered most of the Noirists/black 
elites in the country. As a parallel, Aristide’s Marriage to a mulatto has rendered him 
somewhat less popular in the lower and middle class sector. 
18
 “Dog eats dog”  
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resulted in bloodshed and further radicalization of the popular sector. 
Finally, unable to control the popular sector, to re-assert itself on the 
political landscape, and feeling pressure from the international 
community, the military retreated. The army was weakened by the 
depletion of qualified officers in its ranks after four coups and 
countless murders. Its retreat left the society completely at the mercy 
of the increasingly unruly urban masses. 
With the military weakened by infighting, the church divided, 
the Macoutes disbanded, and institutions such as the judiciary and 
parliament having never enjoyed the confidence of the Haitian 
populace, the terrain was set for either anarchy or a new center of 
power. The mass movement emboldened by the ouster of Duvalier, 
conflicts within the ruling elites and the sudden interest of the 
international community attempted to fill the vacuum.  
Mass Politics and the Failure of Leadership 
With 90 % of the voters registered in an internationally 
supervised election, Aristide won 67 % of the vote in December 1990, 
leaving his most important contender with 14 %. Politically 
inexperienced, unaccustomed to negotiating agreements, literally 
believing in the power and wisdom of the urban masses and besieged 
by a parliament that constitutionally was more powerful than the 
executive branch, Aristide allowed the popular sector to play a direct 
role in national politics. The shift from institutional control and 
accountability to a loose form of semi-anarchical mass politics was 
already apparent in the first two months following his inauguration. 
Unable to get his prime minister ratified, Aristide called on the masses 
who threatened to burn down parliament and use violence against 
elected officials, forcing them to ratify the prime minister out of fear 
for their lives and properties. Aristide’s politics depended on the threat 
of violence by the populace. No institutions or individuals dared to 
disagree with him. Having his supporters as leverage against 
established institutions, Aristide refused to even accept the advice and 
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mandate of the coalition that brought him to power19. The 
unwillingness of the elected government to reign in its supporters, its 
rejection and disregard for traditional politicians, and his attack on the 
military forced a re-alignment of all the ruling elites sectors. The first 
seven months of Aristide’s government witnessed unparalleled attacks 
on the traditional institutions20 as well as his democratic allies. For 
example : 
1) The day of his inauguration, Aristide retired six of the seven 
military generals publicly humiliating an already weak army. 
2) He named a cabinet composed of personal friends, rejecting 
important political figures even in his own party. 
3) He failed to react when his supporters burned down an anti-
government union headquarters and the offices of his former ally, 
FNCD. 
4) He created two independent presidential guards a la Papa 
Doc, in an attempt to distance the military and remove the possibility 
of a coup. 
Prior to his overthrow, Aristide had made enemies of all the 
major institutions in the country21 including some newly established 
ones that supported him during his election. Every major institution 
resented his political tactlessness and his attempt to undermine their 
legitimacy. The army was particularly frustrated with Aristide for 
undermining their prestige and power and humiliating their officer 
 
                                                          
19
 The coalition that brought Aristide to office consisted of five parties : KONAKOM 
- National Congress of the Democratic Movement ; PNDPH - National Popular 
Democratic Haitian Party ; OP-17 - Popular Organization of September 17 ; KID - 
Confederation Democratic Unity ; and FNCD - National Front for Change and 
Democracy. (see Ives, Kim “ The Lavalas Alliance Propels Aristide to Power ”   in 
NACLA 1995.) 
 
20
 See Jean-Francois “ Démocratie et Société en Haiti : Droits Humain en Haiti MPP 
au cœur de la Repression ”, Rencontre #5 1993:8-10 for details on Aristide’s attacks on 
the traditional institutions.  J. P. Slavin in NACLA 1995 Haiti: Dangerous Crossroads. 
Also give some insights on the subject. 
21
 Chamberlain, Greg, “ Haiti’s ‘Second Independence’” NACLA 1995). 
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corps22 ; the Catholic church, because he accused its bishop of being 
enemy of the people and allowed the masses to attack its clergy and 
churches23 ; the parliament, because of Aristide’s use of the urban 
masses to intimidate them and undercut their authority. The political 
parties and experienced politicians were also frustrated with Aristide 
because he had consistently insulted them and sent his supporters to 
harass and threaten them. The economic elites were frustrated because 
Aristide espoused redistributive policies that were against their 
economic interests and allowed and even encouraged the masses to 
burn their properties and businesses while threatening them with “pere 
lebrun”24. Aristide had miscalculated the power of the polls from the 
start. He distanced himself from every other possible source of support, 
and relied on the masses to defend and protect him. Organized by the 
military and external forces25, supported by the church hierarchy and 
financed by the economic elites, the coup came as no surprise. The 
post coup period saw an army determined to re-assert itself by any 
means necessary and send the police packing once and for all. 
In trying to give voice to a population in a system corrupted by 
more than 50 years of dictatorship, Aristide unleashed a monster that 
could not be controlled26. A stable democratic government is often 
 
                                                          
22
 In an interview with Michel François, after the coup, he made it clear that the 
army considered Aristide a threat and that the retirement of its high command on 
inauguration day was seen as an international humiliation. 
23
 The bishop of Haiti, Monsignor François Wolf Ligonde openly accused Aristide 
of being a danger for Haiti.  Also, urban masses had attacked the papal representative 
in Haiti, taking all his clothes off and parading him in the streets.  This barbaric act was 
a public humiliation for the catholic church. 
24
 “Pere Lebrun” is the name given to the practice of burning people alive with a 
tire full of gasoline placed around their neck. There is much debate on whether Aristide 
advocated mob violence, but no one disagrees that his rhetoric incited the urban poor 
to violence and that he never explicitly condemned the violence and live burnings 
orchestrated by his supporters.  
25
 It was reported by the New York Times that General Raoul Cedras was on CIA 
payroll. It was also reported that terror groups were financed by CIA operators to 
destabilize the popular democratic sectors. 
26
 It is clear that Aristide was well intentioned toward the majority of the 
population which had been for so long neglected. The poverty he witnessed while 
working along side them energized him to speak about social justice. Aristide’s 
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characterized as one that is disciplined, united, capable of addressing 
its own internal problems and one that respects the electoral system 
and keeps extremists and radicals away from the decision making 
process and the center of power27. Aristide’s unwillingness to control 
his supporters, his refusal to work with and support the existing 
institutions, his strong arm tactics in the face of parliamentary 
oppositions, and his totalitarian tendencies were important weaknesses 
and determinant factors in the overthrow of the first democratically 
elected government.  
The politics of the populace : Choosing between a strong 
state and anarchy after the coup 
The post-coup period of 1991 through the fall of 1994 saw 
widespread repression by the military aided by FRAPH28, a newly 
organized paramilitary group. Many escaped for their lives on rickety 
boats to be mistreated and repatriated by foreign governments29. 
However, in spite of the oppressive measures against it, the popular 
sector’s resolve for a democratic government remained unchanged. Its 
resolve was partly encouraged by the change in government in the 
United States from Bush to Clinton, the newly acquired political 
savviness of Aristide’s circle on the international scene, and the 
determination of Haitians living abroad, especially in the US, to put an 
                                                          
 
concerns for and closeness to the poor cannot be ignored is assessing his policies. 
However, his reliance on them as a political force is alarming since Aristide has anti-
institutional tendencies and prefers dictations rather than negotiations. 
27
 Blais, Andre and Dion, Stephane. Democracy and Consolidation. - found in 
Ethier, Diane(1990)  
28
 It would become common knowledge that FRAPH was financed by the CIA and 
that his leader Emmanuel Toto Constant was paid monthly for his services. (Haiti 
Insight, vol. 6, N° 6, Aug/Sep 1996.) 
29
 Those same governments did not recognize the de facto regime in Haiti and were 
critical of the campaign of terror being perpetuated by the military. Ironically, they had 
no qualm about sending Haitians back under the control of the very government who 
had forced them to flee and whom they criticized for killing and terrorizing them.  
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end to military rule. The popular sector maintained its hope and vowed 
to resist all tactics by the deadly military/FRAPH/elite alliance.  
Finally, with an embargo imposed by the international 
community, pressure from the “friends of Haiti” (France, Canada, 
Unites States, Argentina and Venezuela) and the threat of frontal 
assault, the military bowed to a “ soft landing ” of US troops30. Tamed 
and temporarily restrained by his commitment to the international 
community to abide by democratic norms, Aristide returned to the 
presidency on october 15, 1994. Soon thereafter, the temporary 
alliance between Aristide and the international community, especially 
the Clinton/Gore administration would be strained by the military 
question. While the Clinton administration sought to re-structure the 
army and “ professionalize ” it, Aristide wanted its elimination, 
modeled after Costa Rica31. The US administration’s goal to 
professionalize the army was ironically undermined by the presence of 
foreign (mainly American) forces32 on Haitian soil. One of the first 
acts of the peace keeping force was to seize and destroy the heavy 
weaponry of the Haitian armed forces - placing them in a subordinate 
and ineffective role. Aristide capitalized on this historic vulnerability 
retiring the remaining military high command who did not go into 
voluntary exile and reduced the force from 7,000 to 1,500. The 
elimination of the military terminated the only mechanism of law and 
order leaving the masses as the most powerful and coercive sector in 
 
                                                          
30
 Although some sanctions were imposed, they were unsuccessful because the 
border between the Dominican Republic and Haiti was used to transport goods into the 
country. The sanctions were in fact very lucrative for the elites and the military officers 
because they controlled the price, transportation and quantity of merchandise in the 
country. It was mainly the average citizen who suffered and had no access to food, 
running water and electricity. 
31
 The former president of Costa Rica, Oscar Arias visited Aristide following his 
return in Haiti to counsel him on the military question. 
32
 The UN forces were American dominated and Clinton hope of protecting the 
army was undermine by the action of his own military, and the mandate to disarm anti-
democratic forces. The American forces destroyed all the heaving weaponry of the 
army but left armed groups operating in the main cities under the leadership of known 
thugs. The military was rendered useless since his coercive capacity and its leaders 
were exiled or removed from power by the American forces.  
204 Moïse S. TIRANO 
 
  
 
PDLC n° 10, 1998 
the country. Aristide would unscrupulously use them to pressure his 
opponents as well as undermine the legitimacy and effectiveness of the 
Preval/Smart government33. 
The demise of the military had also delegitimized most of the 
political parties who had in some fashion participated in post-coup 
governments or not spoken against the coup34. A schism also 
developed between those who had stayed in Haiti to oppose military 
rule and those who had fled into exile. This schism also, for the first 
time, brought to light the two main tendencies within Lavalas. 
According to senior members of the OPL, Aristide’s anti-
institutionalism had to be kept in check for democracy to survive and 
this attempt to balance his power was met with resistance from 
Aristide and his supporters. Unable to make his own choice to form his 
cabinet without the consent of his party, pressured to conform to party 
politics and respect those who had remained in the country, and 
frustrated by the unwillingness of a major sector of his party to support 
the recuperation of the three years spent in exile, Aristide sought to 
distance himself from his own party35.  
It did not take long for factionalism to develop within OPL. A 
solution was sought by choosing Rene Preval as candidate for the 
presidency. Aware of the relationship between Aristide and Preval, OPL 
selected the latter to ensure the continuity and implementation of 
Aristide’s policies and most importantly, his blessing. This strategy 
proved unsuccessful as Aristide refused to support his close associate 
 
                                                          
33
 After the shooting of his cousin in the summer of 1996, Aristide sent the 
populace into the street to search cars for weapons. This created much tension in the 
country. 
34
 The involvement of some parties in the military government has helped to 
discredit them in the eyes of the population and will hinder their electoral bid. Parties 
such as PREN led by Alix Cineas, ANDP by Marc Basin, UNFD by Honorat and PANPRA 
by Serge Gilles have discredited themselves through their participation in the military 
regime. It may take a long time for any of their leaders to become viable candidates in 
important elections. 
35
 See Gros, Jean-Germain “ Haiti’s Flagging Transition ”, Journal of Democracy, 
8,4 (1997) 94-109. 
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and former prime minister until two days before the elections36. As a 
result, voter turnout was at its lowest ever and coalition politics in 
parliament became impossible as member allegiances fluctuated 
sometimes hourly37. 
Out of 30 % voter turnout, Preval won by 89 % 38. The Preval 
government which was weak, enjoyed neither the confidence of OPL 
nor the support of Aristide saddled with a constitution that sapped the 
presidency of all powers (Gros 1997 : 97-109),  became mired in 
gridlock. Two months after his inauguration, the government faced 
strong criticism from all sides due to its implementation of an 
economic program that his predecessor had worked out in the Paris 
Conference in July 1994. With no funds in state coffers, Preval could 
neither use state patronage to attain parliamentary and mass support or 
institute programs to increase his popularity. He was forced to retreat 
and his capitulation caused most of the international donors to 
withhold their funds39. 
It was apparent to most observers that OPL would split and it was 
no surprise when Aristide, hoping to undermine the influence and 
power of OPL, finally formed his own party - Fanmi Lavalas, ending 
one of the most important political alliances in Haitian democratic 
history. Members of OPL boasted that the party could not be 
undermined because while Aristide was enjoying his stay in New 
York, they were engaged with the populace and establishing a firm 
 
                                                          
36
 This interestingly was the same prime minister against whom Aristide had sent 
the masses to intimidate parliament in 1991 ! 
37
 I attended a few political meetings in 1995 and 1996 in various parts of the 
country, where voters displayed their frustrations and confusion because they could no 
longer determine which politicians they could trust. Some of these meetings were 
organized by Non-Governmental Organizations and NDI (National Institute for 
Democracy), as well as Organization Politique Lavalas (now Organization du Peuple 
en Luttes). 
 
39
 The Haitian government and international lending institutions have worked out 
an arrangement to ensure that funds will be disbursed to the government regardless of 
the actions of parliament. This arrangement would help the Preval government gain 
some legitimacy by instituting some programs to help the popular sector. 
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base within the population. As many observers pointed out, by 
breaking with OPL, Aristide lost his monopoly on the population. This 
split could potentially offer the only vehicle for political contestation. 
However, with Aristide’s demagoguery, his messianic tendency and 
his manipulation of the masses, Haiti may miss the democratic boat40. 
The challenge of democratic leadership : using the urban 
masses as political actors ? 
Historically, the Haitian masses have been used by strong men 
and politicians as a source of power in Haiti and the state has always 
been at their mercy. In the post-independence period until the US 
occupation of 1915, regional strong men manipulated the illiterate 
peasantry and organized them into armed bands to usurp power and 
create instability in Haiti. From 1804 to 1915, 15 out of 19 heads of 
state were either murdered or overthrown by regional uprisings 
(Sangmpam , 1995)41. The US occupation eliminated the capacity of 
regional forces to make frontal assaults on the state and organized a 
military capable of keeping the rural population in check. Its 
centralization policies brought the rural population to the city and 
created another phenomena. The period following the Marines forceful 
departure from Haiti was marked by the rise of urban politicians who 
manipulated popular dissent to incite urban uprisings and violence in 
the capital42. Duvalier had put an end to this phenomena by initially 
espousing its cause and later through terror tactics and by using some 
of the same urban elements to create his own military force – the VSN. 
Under the Duvaliers, the illiterate urban population was kept in check 
 
                                                          
40
 In various political meetings throughout the country, it was apparent that people 
were beginning to question Aristide’s motive. However, the factions that usually 
followed him offered fanatical support and were willing to resort to violence to achieve 
their goals. For them, Aristide could do no wrong and his speeches or sermons as they 
are referred to were often taken literally. 
41
 See Sangmpam, S. N., “ The Overpoliticized State and International Politics ”. 
Third World Quarterly- Journal of Emerging Areas Vol. 16, n° 4, Dec. 1995 p. 619-
641. 
42
 Daniel, Fignole who preceded Francois Duvalier, was known for such tactics. 
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through clientelist networks and repression. The 1980’s was the first 
time in more than three decades that the masses were able to flex their 
muscles against a less than cohesive ruling elite.  
Culturally homogeneous, with an illiteracy rate of more than 
70 %, sharing political experiences and grudges against a state that has 
for decades neglected and terrorized them, the urban masses were 
inclined to follow anyone who took up their cause. Aristide with his 
anti-Duvalierist, anti-Macoutes, anti-US and pro-redistribution/populist 
rhetoric was the perfect candidate. His first seven months in office 
reflected his pledge to fight for the masses but they also showed his 
uncanny tendency to mobilize them to do his bindings instead of 
relying on democratic method and institutional channels. His years in 
exile produced a more sophisticated politician but did not eliminate his 
tendencies to attack the state institutions and manipulate the populace. 
A skillful orator, aware of linguistic idiosyncrasies, Aristide no longer 
overtly incites the masses but still maintains a hold on the most radical 
and poorest sector that makes his commitment to democratic 
governance and faith in democratic institutions questionable but 
necessary for the future of Haitian democracy43.  
Until the split of OPL, the monopolization of the political space 
offered a bleak future for Haiti44. Overpoliticization, the absence of 
strong democratic institutions and the weakness of the new police force 
 
                                                          
43
 In this regard, I concur with Gros, have that leadership is crucial for democracy 
to survive in Haiti : various groups associated with his party has been involved in anti-
democratic activities. Armed men from these groups have attacked police stations and 
killed officers of the law. They have also been involved in activities such as 
Kidnappings and intimidation campaigns. Aristide’s silence in the face of these actions 
reflects a particular pattern. (See Gros 1997 and Haiti Info’s January, April and March 
1998 issues). 
44
 Even with a 30 % voter turnout, Preval obtained 89 % of the vote. In the 
preceding parliamentary elections Lavalas, also won 80 % of the seats and most of 
them with a vote ratio of 10/1. This is partly because most of the opposition parties 
were discredited for their involvement and miscalculations during the three years after 
the coup. (see LIBETE - a Haitian news paper written in Creole.) The IRI (International 
Republican Institute also noted that “ the massive abstention and lopsided vote raised 
deeply disturbing questions concerning the future of democratic institutions, processes, 
and culture in Haiti ” (IRI - Haiti - Election Observation Report - Dec. 17, 1995). 
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made leadership one of the primary factors for the future of Haitian 
democracy. However the presence of two strong parties, has the 
potential to offer a broader choice to the population and may eliminate 
the trend toward vote concentration that is so characteristic of 
emerging democracies where ethnic politics does not play a central 
role45. Both parties have a strong constituent base and legitimacy, 
which sets the stage for real political contestation to take place. 
However, everything depends on belief in the usefulness of 
democracy, Aristide’s willingness to play by the rules, and a change 
from the tendency of zero sum politics to political negotiations and 
coalitions to facilitate governance. Although the strength of the two 
parties may create the space for negotiation, democratic leadership 
remains indispensable for such negotiations to occur. As Aristide’s 
monopoly on the population eclipses, his messianic tendency and his 
inciting oratory may become less and less tenable46. 
Nevertheless, the consolidation of Haitian democracy still 
depends heavily on the popular sector more so than it does on the weak 
institutions that currently exist. As Lipset correctly argues ; “ new 
democracies must be institutionalized, consolidated, and become 
legitimate. They face many problems, among which are creating a 
growing and more equalitarian economy; reducing the tensions with, 
and perhaps replacing, the old civil and military elites ” (Lipset, 1993, 
7). Neo-liberal economic policies such as privatization of state-owned 
 
                                                          
45
 The phenomena of voter monopoly is not unique to Haiti. Many democracies 
such as Spain, Mexico until recently, Dominican Republic, to name a few, experienced 
one-party “ democracies ”. New democracies in Eastern Central Europe also 
experience this phenomena. In a paper presented at the New England Political Science 
Association I argued that Voter concentration may provide legitimacy, stability, 
continuity and a chance to strengthen democratic institutions during the transitional 
period. I still think that it is something to consider as Spain and Mexico experienced at 
least 10 years of one-party rule prior to becoming a polyarchy. International actors 
should recognize this as an important aspect of democratic transitions and not try to 
create multi-party systems prematurely. Given due time, multi-party systems are likely 
to develop out of the contradictions and shortcomings of the dominant party. 
46
 This is reflective of the songs during the 1998 carnival which criticized Aristide 
and other political leader.  Also popular organizations who have historically supported 
him are distancing themselves from him and asking the parties to negotiate an end to 
the crisis (HaitiInfo, March 14, 1998) 
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industries and parastatal organizations and the trimming down of the 
state workforce coupled with the rising prices of food and basic 
products have created widespread discontent and may force the 
population into the streets. The reaction to economic hardship 
associated with democratization threatens the stability of the 
democratic process. In this context, neo-liberal policies seem to be an 
anathema to democratic continuity. The further deterioration of the 
social climate and the standard of living as a result of these policies 
and the absence of a competent police force capable of controlling a 
population known for its excesses has made political legitimacy and 
good leadership indispensable to democratic consolidation47. 
“ Political stability in a democratic system relies heavily on legitimacy 
and explicit or implicit support from the citizenry ” (Lipset, 1993, 7). 
Economic hardship and the neo-liberal policies associated with the US 
sponsored democratic model appear to be exacerbating the 
institutional, leadership and legitimacy problems of the vacillating 
Haitian democratic system. 
The ability of a new democratic government to use the coercive 
arm of the state diminishes, they seem plagued by “ growing crises of 
governability ”. Overpoliticization, frustrations about high inflation, 
increased demands on the state by the popular and elite sectors for 
security, economic efficiency and better service, make Haitian 
democracy extremely fragile. The observation that “ the combination 
of democracy, low income economy, substantial inequities and state 
intervention tends to politicize all forms of societal cleavages - old 
versus new, social and economic ” appears to be partially applicable to 
Haiti (Kohli, 1993, 677). The “ accumulation of distributive claims ” 
on the state and its ability to address those claims has been a source of 
destabilization and delegitimacy. According to Kohli, “ given the 
scarcity in a poor economy, the competitive energies of the many 
 
                                                          
47
 The police force has become the target of former military and paramilitary thugs 
as well as bandits. From January to mid-June of 1995, eight (8) police officers were 
murdered. Their inability to protect themselves have made the population less and less 
confident in the police’s ability to protect them. My interviews with neighborhood 
watch groups suggest hat lack of confidence in the police has forced them to take 
matters into their own hands.  (see HaitiInsight’s of Aug/Sep 1996 for more details.) 
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individuals and groups seeking economic improvements tend to get 
focused on the state ”. Thus, he adds, “ competition over state 
resources often results in intense conflicts, contributing to the problems 
of democratic consolidation ” stability and governance (Kohli, 1993, 
677). It is an increasingly widely held view that this new wave of 
democratization comes with expectations that are difficult to satisfy 
without sustained economic growth. What is more, scholars 
overwhelmingly agree that in these new democracies, economic 
policies must be adjusted to “ fit democratic mandates ” and the 
expectations of the populace. Linz and Stepan (1997) however, have 
mistakenly argued that economic problems may not be a catalyst for 
attacks on the state48. These authors assert that new democracies face 
undue expectations and that the quality of democracy and the “ quality 
of society must be disassociated ”. For these two scholars, “ no 
democracy can assure the presence of reputable bankers, entrepreneurs 
with initiative, physicians devoted to their patients, competent 
professors, creative scholars and artists or even honest judges ” (Linz 
and Stepan, 1997, 30). While they may be correct that new 
democracies have many difficulties to overcome, they may have 
ignored the fact that in many places democracy was fought for on the 
belief that it would ameliorate the living conditions of the citizenry. If 
democracy cannot assure the reliability of the national professionals, it 
must at least create the conditions, institutional framework and 
environment necessary to make them accountable. 
We would have to concur with Gros that “ the challenge for 
Haiti is to find a sustainable democratic alternative ” (Gros, 1997, 
106). What constitute this sustainable democratic alternative ? Clearly, 
the challenge to democratic rule in Haiti rests not on the absence or 
presence of “ western culture and values ” as some scholars suggest. It 
is rather the conditions under which the transition took place, the 
imposition of external forces and the elusive commitment of political 
leaders. 
 
                                                          
48
 These authors have indicated ethnic politics are more prone to destabilize, make 
the state a target, than economic hardships. This oversight is mainly due to the fact that 
they have ignored the correlation between economic decline and the rise in ethnic 
conflicts. There have been many studies about the US that validate this correlation. 
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The continued reliance of the state on the international security 
forces for protection against paramilitary groups and the urban masses 
is indicative of its apparent weakness. If democracy cannot be 
protected nationally and by the average Haitian citizen, then we should 
not be too optimistic about its survival. The challenge is to provide 
enough incentives to make democracy not only indispensable but 
desirable for the elites and populace alike. This cannot be achieved 
with an incapacitated state that is unable to maintain law and order, 
strengthen its institutions and revitalize its economy. 
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Résumé 
 
Cet essai cherche à analyser la 
démocratie haïtienne à travers le débat 
dominant sur la transition et la 
consolidation à partir duquel toutes 
les démocraties sont évaluées et des 
hypothèses qui en découlent 
concernant l’Etat, la société civile, la 
politique électorale, la capacité des 
institutions et le secteur populaire. 
Bien que la démocratie haïtienne livre 
une difficile bataille, on argumentera 
qu’elle peut encore s’épanouir. Une 
tentative sérieuse pour répondre aux 
attentes du peuple selon lesquelles 
une démocratie devrait signifier une 
vie meilleure pour tout le monde 
pourrait être effective avec des 
réformes institutionnelles appropriées, 
un leadership responsable et 
compétent, la rationalisation de l’Etat 
et la limitation de la politique de 
masse. 
 
 Abstract 
 
This essay seeks to evaluate 
Haitian democracy through the 
dominant democratic transition and 
consolidation debate by which all 
democracies are being assessed and 
the inherent assumptions being made 
about the state, civil society, electoral 
politics, institutional capacity and the 
popular sector.  While it is true that 
Haitian democracy faces an uphill 
battle, it will be argued that 
democracy can still thrive. A serious 
attempt to meet people’s expectations 
that a democracy should mean a 
better life for everyone could be 
effective with the right institutional 
reforms, responsible and competent 
leadership, the rationalization of the 
state, and the curtailment of mob 
politics. 
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